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I.

INTRODUCTION

A manufacturing company has recently posted a vacancy. The vacancy
is open to all current company employees and outside applicants. The
company's longstanding policy has been to hire the most qualified applicant for
the job, whether that person is a current employee or an outside applicant. The
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company generally gives current employees a slight advantage over outside
applicants, but nonetheless, the most qualified applicant will be chosen. Several
current employees apply for the position, all seeking the transfer because it will
be an improvement over their current position. Among the current employees
who apply, there is one man who has worked at the company for years, but who
has recently suffered a permanent back injury that renders him unable to
perform the functions of his current position. Due to this injury, the man
qualifies as a disabled employee protected by the Americans with Disabilities
Act ("ADA"). He and the company have attempted to modify the essential
functions of his job description so that he could remain in his position, but
nothing has been successful. Thus, he is seeking reassignment to the vacant
position as a reasonable accommodation under the ADA.
Amongst the candidates seeking the manufacturing company's
vacancy, the disabled employee is not the most qualified candidate. In fact, he
holds the minimal qualifications necessary to be considered. When it comes
time to make a hire, the manufacturing company chooses another, highly
qualified individual for the vacant position. There are no other vacancies in the
company. The disabled employee and the company make further attempts to
accommodate his disability to maintain his employment, but are unsuccessful.
Thus, the company decides to terminate the disabled employee.
Subsequently, the disabled employee files a discrimination lawsuit,
alleging that the company failed to reasonably accommodate his disability in
violation of the ADA. He argues that the employer was obligated to reassign
him to the vacant position over the more qualified individual who earned the
position. He files the lawsuit in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, located within the Seventh Circuit. Citing recently
held precedent for support, the judge finds for the disabled employee, holding
that the ADA mandates reassignment to vacant positions even for minimally
qualified disabled employees who can no longer perform the essential functions
of their current position due to their disability. Thus, the manufacturing
company violated the statute by not reassigning the minimally qualified
disabled employee over the most qualified candidate who earned the position.
This hypothetical situation highlights an issue that has sparked debate
amongst the federal circuits. The United States Courts of Appeals for the
Seventh, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits have all interpreted the ADA to require
employers to reassign disabled employees to vacant positions over more
1
qualified applicants under the ADA's reasonable accommodation provisions.
On the other hand, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
has held the opposite, interpreting the ADA to allow competitive

See Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc); Aka v. Wash.
Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Taylor Brooke Concannon, Don't Throw the Baby
Out with the Bathwater: Taking the Seventh Circuit'sDecision in EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc.

I

Too Far,52 WASHBURN L.J. 613, 614 (2013).
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reassignments. 2 The remaining circuits have tended to avoid the direct question
of whether reassignment to a vacant position is mandated under the ADA, but
some have discussed the issue in slightly different contexts. The circuit split
runs along lines of statutory interpretation, policy concerns, and business
interests. Congress included reassignment as a possible accommodation for an
employee who could no longer perform the essential functions of his position,
but courts have disagreed on whether reassignment is required in the face of
non-discriminatory hiring policies.
This Note will argue that mandating reassignment of a minimally
qualified disabled employee to a vacant position over a more qualified
individual who has applied to the position is unreasonable because it would
create an undue hardship for the employer. Thus, the Fourth Circuit should not
follow the Seventh, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits when presented with this question
in the future. Section II of this Note will outline general provisions of the ADA,
the ADA's reasonable accommodation provision, the purpose of the ADA, and
the basics of reassignment as a reasonable accommodation. Section III will
analyze the case law that has arisen within the reassignment context. Section
III.A will discuss the United States Supreme Court's decision in US Airways,
Inc. v. Barnett,3 which is the Court's only opinion concerning reassignment
under the ADA. Section III.B will analyze the circuits that have concluded that
the ADA may require reassignment, even over a more qualified candidate.
Section III.C will next analyze the case law that has interpreted the ADA as not
requiring reassignment. Section IV will argue why mandated reassignment is
unreasonable in light of congressional intent, effect on third parties, and the
burden on the employer. Section V will suggest that the Fourth Circuit follow
the Eighth Circuit's reasoning that the ADA does not mandate reassignment
over a more qualified individual.
II. BACKGROUND

To better understand the reasoning of the courts in reassignment cases,
it is necessary to understand the ADA and its purpose. The ADA was passed in
1990 and codified under 42 U.S.C. § 12101. 4 The ADA was based heavily on
its predecessor, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 5 However, the Rehabilitation
Act only applied "to federal government agencies, government contractors, and

2

See Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 486 F.3d 480 (8th Cir. 2007).

3

535 U.S. 391 (2002).

4

42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2012).

See Carrie L. Flores, Note, A Disability Is Not a Trump Card: The Americans with
Disabilities Act Does Not Entitle Disabled Employees To Automatic Reassignment, 43 VAL. U.
L. REv. 195, 202 (2008).
5
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recipients of federal funds .... 6 When the ADA was enacted in 1990, it was
the first time the federal government imposed the same rules on the private
sector that it had imposed on public employment for nearly 30 years. 7 The
ADA applies to both public and private sectors, addressing discrimination
based on disability in the areas of employment and public services, programs,
activities, and accommodations. 8 The Act is regulated by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). 9
While it was considering the ADA, Congress found census data,
national polls, and other studies showing that disabled individuals, as a group,
°
occupied an inferior status in society and were severely disadvantaged.' A
survey cited by Congress found that persons with disabilities generally are
poorer, have less education, have less social and community life, and express
less satisfaction with life compared to non-disabled persons." As such,
Congress set out to end this disparity. The purpose of the ADA was to provide
"a clear and comprehensive national mandate" to end disability discrimination
and bring disabled individuals into the American mainstream.' 2 In order to
accomplish this goal, Congress recognized that it was pivotal for disabled
individuals to gain employment and stay employed. 13 The high expectation was

Id.; see also Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and
Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 9 (1996).
6

7

RUTH COLKER, THE DISABILITY PENDULUM: THE FIRST DECADE OF THE AMERICANS WITH

DISABILITIES ACT 22 (2005). Its predecessor, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, only protected
federal employees and employees of institutions that received federal aid. Joshua Benjamin
Forman, Not Getting Hired Because You Are Obese, but Not Getting Fired Because You Are
Obese: How the New Changes to the ADA Have Set a Double Standard, and What's to Prevent
Companies from Trimming the Fat at the Office 5 (Aug. 2012) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgiarticle=1002&context=joshua-forman
(citing 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2013) ("No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the
United States ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any
Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service.")).
8
Flores, supra note 5, at 202-03.
9
42 U.S.C. § 12111(1) (2013); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12116.
to
See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(6).
u
H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 25 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 447.
12
Id. at 23. The ADA protects two types of individuals. "A disabled individual who could
perform the job in its present form, but whom the employer refuses to hire because of a... belief
that she cannot perform the requisite tasks or out of revulsion against the worker's
disability .... " Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 6, at 8. "The other category of protected
individuals consists of persons whose physical or mental impairments prevent them from
performing the job in its current form, but who could perform the job if it were reconfigured in
an appropriate fashion." Id. at 8-9.
13 Concannon, supra note 1, at 620.
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that the ADA would open doors for individuals with disabilities to all sectors of
the economy, not just those that were federally-funded. 14
Despite the good will and lofty intentions that the original ADA set out
to fulfill, those goals were not realized. 15 This was primarily attributed to the
imprecise language and conflicting judicial opinions produced by the Act. 16
Accordingly, Congress passed the ADA Amendments Act of 2008
("ADAAA"). 17 House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer, Representative Jim
Sensenbrenner, Senator Tom Harkin, and Senator Orrin Hatch led the charge to
revise the narrow interpretations placed upon the ADA by the Supreme Court.' 8
One of Congress's primary purposes in passing this amended act was to
broaden the definition of "disability."' 9 Congress was dissatisfied that the
courts had strictly defined disability, thereby finding that many claimants were
not disabled under the ADA.2 ° Congress also sought to provide some protection
for soldiers returning home from the conflict in the Middle East, many of
whom returned with psychological illnesses. 2' Thus, Congress broadened the
scope of what constitutes a disability by stating that the law should be more
inclusive and less exclusive.22
The ADA is unique among other anti-discrimination statutes because it
places an affirmative duty on an employer to assist an employee in performing
essential job functions. 23 The ADA, Title VII, and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act ("ADEA") are the three major employment antidiscrimination statutes that Congress has passed.24 Title VII prohibits
14

Cheryl L. Anderson, Ideological Dissonance, Disability Backlash, and the ADA

Amendments Act, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1267, 1277 (2009).

15 See Adam Keating, Reexamining Reasonableness: An Analysis of Reasonable
Accommodation Under the ADA 4 (Apr. 26, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfinabstractid= 1597416.
16 Id.; see also Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002); Anderson,
supra note 14, at 1278-84 (discussing how courts were left to interpret the statute with a limited
sense of the history of discriminatory treatment of disabled individuals).
17 Keating, supra note 15, at 5.
18

EMILY

A.

BENFER,

AM.

CONSTITUTION

SOC'Y FOR LAW

AND

POLICY,

THE

ADA

AMENDMENTS ACT: AN OVERVIEW OF RECENT CHANGES TO THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES

ACT

1

(2009),

available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/archiveada/documents/Benfer

ADAAA.pdf.
9
Id. at2.
20

Id. at 3.

21

Sandra K. Collins & Eric P. Matthews, Americans with DisabilityAct: FinancialAspects of
Reasonable Accommodations and Undue Hardship, 39 J. HEALTH CARE FIN. 79, 80 (2012).
22 See Benfer, supra note 18, at 3.
23
See Stephen F. Befort & Tracey Holmes Donesky, Reassignment Under the Americans
with Disabilities Act: Reasonable Accommodation, Affirmative Action, or Both?, 57 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 1045, 1047 (2000).
24
See id.
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employers from making adverse employment decisions "because of' race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; the ADEA prohibits employers from
25
discriminating against a person's age. In contrast, while the ADA bans
discrimination "because of' disability, it goes a step further than the other antidiscrimination statutes by imposing an affirmative duty on the employer to
assist the disabled employee to sufficiently perform the essential functions of
the job.26 Neither Title VII nor the ADEA allow protected persons to demand
accommodation in their favor.27 Under those statutes, a person can only
demand that he be treated equally and without discrimination.
Under the ADA, the term "disability" means any impairment that
29
substantially limits one or more major life activities of an individual. Physical
impairments include disorders that affect the neurological system, the
musculoskeletal system, the respiratory system, and the cardiovascular
system. 30 Mental impairments include "mental retardation, organic brain
's
syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.
This includes any individual who is "regarded as" having such an
impairment.3 2 An individual satisfies the "regarded as" requirement by showing
that the person has been subjected to an adverse employment action because of

25

See id.

26

Id. at 1047-48. The ADA

requires employers not just to eschew disability-based disparate treatment or
to revise policies that have an adverse disparate impact on disabled
employees as a class, but to attend to every (qualified) disabled employee's
unique needs and to tailor workplace policies accordingly so that every
(qualified) disabled employee can fully participate in the workplace.
Matthew A. Shapiro, Labor Goals and Antidiscrimination Norms: Employer Discretion,
Reasonable Accommodation, and the Costs of Individualized Treatment, 32 YALE L. & POL'Y
REv. 1, 29 (2013).
See Befort & Donesky, supra note 23, at 1047. Title VII allows for a limited duty to
27
accommodate for an individual's religion. Id. at 1047 n.10. However, Title VII's religious
reasonable accommodation provision places a very slight legal obligation on employers as the
Supreme Court, in order to avoid constitutional questions under the Establishment Clause, has
interpreted the provision very narrowly. Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 6, at 6-7. In contrast,
"there is no constitutional principle [restricting] government benefits for the disabled"; "[t]he
door was thus open for the duty of reasonable accommodation to receive a broader
interpretation" under the ADA. Id. at 7-8.
See Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 6, at 7-8.
28
42 U.S.C. § 12102(l)(A) (2012). A major life activity includes "caring for oneself,
29
performing manual tasks, .... eating, sleeping, walking,.... and working." 42 U.S.C. §
12102(2)(A).
30 H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 28 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 450. This
is not an exhaustive list, but features some of the major bodily systems.
Id.
31
32

42 U.S.C. § 12102(l)(C).
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an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment, whether or not the
impairment actually limits a major life activity of that person.33
A claim for failure to accommodate does not require a showing of
intentional discrimination. 34 An accommodation is generally regarded as any
change in the work environment or way that tasks are usually done to allow the
disabled employee equal employment opportunities. 35 "An employer is not
required to [grant] the specific accommodation that the employee requests, but
EEOC regulations... make clear that the preference of the [employee] should
be given consideration. 3' 6 Furthermore, an employer is not required to provide
an ineffective accommodation.37 The employee must provide proof that the
proposed accommodation will actually enable him to perform the essential
functions of the job.38 A reasonable accommodation may include making
existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to a disabled employee,
job restructuring, modification or acquisition of equipment, reassignment to a
vacant position, etc. 39 Essentially, this imposes a duty on the employer to take a
wide range of actions to accommodate an employee before the employer is
permitted to release the disabled employee. For an employer to lawfully release
a disabled individual from his services without providing an accommodation,
the employer must show that the accommodation imposes an undue hardship
on the employer.40
Under the ADA, an "undue hardship" is any action that would require
significant difficulty or expense on the part of the employer. 41 The ADA lists
several factors for courts to analyze when considering undue hardship: the size
of the employer, the financial resources of the facility or the employer overall,
and the type of operations undertaken by the employer. 42 The burden of
proving an undue hardship is placed upon the defendant-employer.43
Subsequently, the nature of an undue hardship will depend on the size of the
33

42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A).

34

BARBARA T. L1NDEMANN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 13-113 (5th ed.

2012).
35 Id.
36
Id. at 13-114.
37
See id. at 13-116.
38

Id.

39

42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(A)-B) (2012).

40

See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(5)(A).

41

42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A).
See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B)(i)-(iv).

42

43
See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). "The burden of proving undue hardship rests with the
defendant because the undue hardship defense is an affirmative defense to a claim of
discrimination under the ADA." Rachel Schneller Ziegler, Safe, but Not Sound: Limiting Safe
Harbor Immunity for Health and Disability Insurers and Self-Insured Employers Under the
Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 101 MICH. L. REv. 840, 868 (2002).
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employer and its financial resources. Smaller companies generally have more
limited obligations, whereas larger companies will find it more difficult to
prove an undue hardship. 44 Courts have also looked at other factors not listed in
the statute or regulations to determine whether a particular action constitutes an
undue hardship. Past practices of society, the effect on others, and a cost45
benefit analysis of the requested accommodation have all been considered.
Undue hardship is an affirmative defense to discrimination under the ADA.
Thus, the defendant-employer will be absolved of liability if it can prove the
existence of an undue hardship.4 6
EEOC guidelines also state that once an individual with a disability
requests an accommodation, the employer should engage in an interactive
47
process to ascertain what type of accommodation should be made. This is
intended to be an informal process where the employer is entitled to ask
48
relevant questions that will enable it to make a decision. The employee does
not have to identify a specific accommodation, but he does have to describe the
limitations that he faces because of the disability so that the employer can make
an effective accommodation. 49 In certain situations, the disability and the type
of accommodation needed are obvious, but where they are not, the employer
and the employee should engage in this interactive process to ascertain the best
5
accommodation for the employee without unduly burdening the employer.
Reassignment is specifically listed in the ADA's text as a potential
reasonable accommodation. 5 ' The employer should reassign the employee to an
equivalent position in terms of pay and status.5 2 Employers are not required to
create a new position for the employee and the employer is not required to
reassign another employee in order to make the accommodation for the
53
disabled employee (this is commonly referred to as "bumping"). The position
must be vacant. 4 Moreover, reassignment should be viewed as a last resort

See Mark C. Weber, UnreasonableAccommodation and Due Hardship, 62
1119, 1151 (2010).
45
Ziegler, supra note 43, at 872.
44

46

Id. at 868.

47

See EEOC

ENFORCEMENT

GUIDANCE:

REASONABLE

ACCOMMODATION

FLA.

L. REv.

AND

UNDUE

16
HARDSHIP UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/
at
available
GUIDANCE],
ENFORCEMENT
(2002) [hereinafter
accommodation.html.
48

See id.

49
50

See id.
See id.

51

LINDEMANN ET AL.,

52

Id. at

53

Id. at 13-149.
See id.

54

supra note 34, at 13-146.

13-146 to -147.
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accommodation. It should only be considered when there is no other reasonable
accommodation that would allow the employee to perform the essential
functions of his current position. 55 Additionally, the employer is not obligated
to reassign the disabled employee to the vacant position if he is not qualified
for the position at all. 56 A "qualified individual with a disability," means an
individual with a disability "who, with or without a reasonable accommodation,
can perform the essential functions of the position., 57 In sum, an employer may
be obligated to reassign a disabled employee to a vacant position if he cannot
perform the essential functions of his current position. However, it is unsettled
whether the employer is obligated to reassign the disabled employee over a
more qualified candidate.
III. REASSIGNMENT IN THE COURTS

Federal circuits have been split over the scope of the ADA's reasonable
accommodation requirement. There are only a handful of circuits that have
dealt with reassignment. Of those that have, not all have dealt directly with a
situation where a minimally qualified disabled candidate seeks reassignment
over a more qualified candidate, but rather discuss reassignment in the context
of seniority systems. The following section will outline the split by discussing
the major decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court and the various federal
circuits. Section A will discuss the Supreme Court's leading opinion on
reassignment; Section B will discuss the circuits interpreting the ADA to
mandate reassignment; Section C will discuss the circuits interpreting the ADA
to allow competitive reassignment.
A.

The U.S. Supreme Court

Nearly from the time it was passed, the Supreme Court and federal
appellate courts have attempted to grapple with the broad scope of the ADA.58
Regarding reassignment, the leading Supreme Court case is US Airways, Inc. v.
Barnett.59 In Barnett, the plaintiff injured his back while working in a cargohandling position. 60 US Airways had a well-established seniority system, which
the plaintiff invoked so as to be temporarily reassigned to a mailroom

55

Id. at 13-147.

56

Id. at 13-150.

42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2012); Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 696 (5th Cir.
1995).
58
See Samuel Issacharoff & Erin Scharff, Antidiscriminationin Employment: The Simple, the
Complex, and the Paradoxical19 (N.Y.U. L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 209, 2010).
59 535 U.S. 391 (2002).
60
Id. at 394.
57
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position. 61 However, per company policy, US Airways opened the position to
bidding for senior employees.62 Barnett learned that two employees senior to
him were going to bid on the vacancy.63 Barnett requested that the company
make an exception to the seniority system to allow him to permanently remain
in the mailroom. 64 US Airways allowed Barnett to remain in the mailroom for
five months while it contemplated the accommodation, but eventually chose
not to make an exception. Barnett was subsequently fired.6 5
US Airways argued that the ADA only required equal treatment of
individuals with disabilities, and employers were not required to extend
preferential treatment to vacancy applicants.66 Barnett argued that the statute
only required an effective accommodation, which would require the
accommodation to meet the needs of the disability, nothing more.67 Justice
Stephen Breyer, writing for the majority, took a cautionary approach, finding
that disabled employees were entitled to a preference in employment
decisions. 68 On the other hand, the Court found that a reassignment that
violated a bona fide seniority system would normally be unreasonable. 69
However, the majority also held that, even though it was ordinarily
unreasonable to violate an established seniority system, the plaintiff was still
free to show that the requested accommodation was reasonable in the particular
facts of the case. 70 Thus, the Court established a two-step inquiry where the
plaintiff has the initial burden of showing that an accommodation seems
reasonable on its face, whereby the employer would have the burden of
establishing that the requested act would create an undue hardship. 7 '

61

Id. The "seniority system was unilaterally imposed by [US Airways] rather than the

product of a collective bargaining agreement." Nicole B. Porter, Reasonable Burdens: Resolving
the Conflict Between DisabledEmployees and Their Coworkers, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 313, 320
(2007).
62
Barnett, 535 U.S. at 394.
Id.
63
64
Id.
65

Id.

66

Id. at 397.
Id. at 399.
See Concannon, supra note 1, at 628.
Barnett, 535 U.S. at 403.

67
68
69

70
71

Id. at 405.
Id. at 401-02. For example, in the case of Barnett, he would have the initial burden of

showing that allowing him to retain his position in the mailroom would not substantially disrupt
the seniority system that was in place, perhaps by showing that the two other employees could
obtain similar positions without pushing him out. US Airways would then have the burden of
showing that the accommodation would create an undue hardship because it substantially
disrupted the seniority system.
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In his dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia argued that the ADA did not
require a mandatory reassignment to a vacant position. He asserted that the
statute only required that the employer not discriminate against the individual
"because of the disability of such individual. ' 2 Justice Scalia commented that
"the ADA eliminates workplace barriers only if a disability prevents an
employee from overcoming them-those barriers that would not be barriers but
for the employee's disability., 73 In Justice Scalia's view, workplace barriers
eliminated by the ADA "do not include rules and practices that bear no more
heavily upon the disabled employee than upon other[]" employees. 74 In the
context of Barnett, the seniority system burdened the disabled and the nondisabled alike; it was not a barrier because of the disabled individual's
disability. 75 He stated that if the individual was qualified for the position and no
one else was seeking the position, he must be granted the transfer.76 But where
there were other persons seeking the position, the ADA did not "envision the
elimination of obstacles to the emjloyee's service in the new position that have
nothing to do with his disability."
While the Court found that reassignments that violated seniority
systems would normally be unreasonable, it did not conclude that such
reassignments would always be unreasonable. Nor did the Court resolve
whether mandatory reassignment would be appropriate where there was no
seniority system in place. Thus, the question of whether reassignment of a
minimally qualified disabled employee over a more qualified individual was
left open.
B. Circuits that Have Construedthe ADA To Mandate Reassignment as a
ReasonableAccommodation
The Seventh, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits have interpreted the ADA to
mandate reassignment to a vacant position as a reasonable accommodation. The
leading cases on this issue for the Tenth and the D.C. Circuits both came before
72

Id. at 412 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).

Id. at 413 (emphasis in original). Justice Scalia outlined several examples to support his
assertions. For example, "work stations that [could not] accept an employee's wheelchair, or an
assembly-line process that [would require] long hours of standing" would be workplace barriers
that the ADA eliminates in order for the disabled employee to have equal opportunity. Id.
However, it would not be required for the employer to compensate the disabled employee more
than a similarly situated non-disabled employee, even if the higher pay was earmarked for
physical therapy. Id.
74 Id.
75
Id.; see also Rebecca Pirius, "Seniority Rules": Disabled Employees' Rights Under the
ADA Give Way to More Senior Employees-U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 29 WM. MITCHELL L.
REv. 1481, 1508 (2003).
76
Barnett, 535 U.S. at 416.
73

77

Id.
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the Supreme Court ruled on Barnett.78 The Seventh Circuit recently changed its
position on the issue in light of the Barnett decision and now shares the view of
the Tenth and D.C. Circuits.79
1. The D.C. Circuit
In 1994, Etim Aka ("Aka") filed a lawsuit in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia alleging violations of the ADA and the
ADEA. 80 Aka began working for the defendant, Washington Hospital Center
("WHC"), as an Operating Room Orderly in 1972.81 These duties included
tasks such as "transporting patients and medical supplies to and from WHC's
operating room, [and it] required substantial amounts of heavy lifting and
pushing., 82 In 1991, Aka underwent heart bypass surgery after being admitted
to a hospital for heart and circulatory problems.83
Aka spent several months in rehabilitation from his surgery and was
placed on medical leave of absence by WHC.84 After his rehabilitation ended,
Aka's doctor gave him permission to return to work, but he was restricted to
light or moderate levels of exertion. 85 He requested to be transferred to a
position that was compatible with his medical restrictions, but WHC refused,
claiming that it was Aka's responsibility to browse the company's job vacancy
postings and apply for a suitable position.86 At the time, WHC had a standing
collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") with hospital employees stipulating
that hospital employees were to be given preference over non-hospital
employees for vacant positions according to their seniority. 8' Aka did as the
employer stipulated and applied for several File Clerk positions and for a
Central Pharmacy Technician position. 88 Despite his position as a hospital

78

See Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc); Aka v. Wash.

Hosp. Center, 156 F.3d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc). Though these decisions came out before
Barnett, they are still representative of the circuits' positions.
79
See EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc., 693 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2012).
80
Aka, 156 F.3d at 1287.
81

Id. at 1286.

82

Id.

83

Id.

84

Id.

85

Id.

86

Id.

Id. at 1286-87. Hospital employees were to be given preference over non-hospital
employees. Of current hospital employees, those with more seniority were to be given higher
preference. However, less senior applicants could be hired if they were more qualified.
87

88

Id. at 1287.
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employee with 20 years of service, Aka was passed over for all of the positions
for which he applied.89
Aka filed suit, claiming that the hospital violated its duty to reasonably
accommodate his disability when it failed to place him in either the Central
Pharmacy Technician position or one of the File Clerk positions. 90 The district
court concluded that the CBA prevented the hospital from reassigning him
outside the normal job application process, but the court of appeals vacated the
judgment. 9' Upon rehearing, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc,
concluded that the district court erred by granting summary judgment to WHC
on the reasonable accommodation claim. 9 The court concluded that the ADA,
in some cases, required the employer to reassign a disabled employee as a
reasonable accommodation unless there was an undue hardship on the
employer. 93

Responding to dissents from Judge Karen Henderson and Judge
Laurence Silberman, the majority found that the word "reassign" within the
statutory text must mean something more than allowing a disabled individual to
apply for a job on the same basis as non-disabled applicants. 94 The majority
also held that Congress could not have intended for the statute to withhold
preference to the disabled employee, reasoning that the opposite conclusion
would render the statutory language concerning "bumping" redundant. 95 The
court conceded that "the ADA's legislative history [did] warn against
preferences for disabled applicants," but that this prohibition on preferences did
not include current employees. 96 The court further concluded that the
reassignment provision would be a "nullity" if it did nothing
more than put the
97
candidates.
other
with
footing
equal
on
employee
disabled
On the other hand, the two dissenting opinions construed the statute
differently, citing ADA legislative history in opposition to the majority. Judge
Henderson found that WHC had fulfilled its duty to accommodate Aka by
giving him the opportunity to apply for the vacancies and giving him

89

See id.

90

See id. at 1286.

91

Id. at 1287-88.

92

Id.

93
94

Id. at 1303.
Id. at 1304.

95

Id.

Id. "If an employee, because of disability, can no longer perform the essential functions of
the job that. . . he has held, a transfer to another vacant job... may prevent.., the employer
from losing a valuable worker." H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 63 (1990), reprinted in 1990
96

U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,345.
97
Aka, 156 F.3d at 1305.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2014

13

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 117, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 9

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 117

interviews. 98 He concluded that WHC did not discriminate against Aka because
of his disability, but rather because the other applicants were more qualified. 99
Judge Silberman concluded that the majority overemphasized the dictionary
definition of the word "reassign" and that the majority declined to keep the
reasonable accommodation language within the context of the other
accommodations listed in the statute. 00 Judge Silberman explained that all of
the other accommodations mentioned in the statute regulated the relationship
between the employer and the disabled employee with minimal effect on other
employees, but the reassignment provision necessarily has a greater impact on
other non-disabled employees.' 0'
2.

The Tenth Circuit

One year after the D.C. Circuit laid down its ruling that the ADA may
mandate reassignment as a reasonable accommodation, a case arose in the
United States District Court for the District of Kansas that did not involve a
CBA and forced the court to tackle the issue more directly. 10 2 In Smith v.
Midland Brake, Inc., 10 3 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals also sat en banc to
review the previous judgment by the court that held, in part, that a plaintiff was
entitled to more than just consideration for a new position in light of a
reassignment request.104
The plaintiff, Robert Smith, was employed by Midland Brake for
nearly seven years in the light assembly department to assemble and test small
air valve components of air brakes for large vehicles.' 05 In this position, Smith
was exposed to various chemicals, solvents, and irritants that led to muscular
injuries and chronic dermatitis in his hands. 106 Smith's physicians restricted his
work activities, recommending that he avoid further exposure to contact
07
irritants and ordering him, on occasion, not to work at all for limited periods. 1
Moreover, Smith admitted that his physicians considered him to be
permanently disabled, "unfit to work in the light assembly department due to
his chronic dermatitis,... and that Midland Brake was unable to find [a

98

Id. at 1311 (Henderson, J., dissenting).

99

See id.

100

Id. at 1314 (Silberman, J., dissenting).

1o1 Id. The effect on other employees in the workplace is further expanded upon in Part IV.B
of this Note.
102 See Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
103

Id.

104

Id. at 1166.

105

Id. at 1160.

106

Id.
Id.

107
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suitable accommodation] within the light assembly department that Smith
could perform given his physical limitations."' 10 8 Because it could not find a
reasonable accommodation within the light assembly department, Midland
Brake terminated Smith. 109
Smith filed suit under the ADA, claiming Midland Brake failed to
reasonably accommodate him, but the district court entered summary judgment
in favor of Midland Brake."10 The court held that Smith was not a qualified
individual with a disability because he never provided the employer with a
medical release to return to work."' The court of appeals affirmed the decision,
but reasoned that Smith was not a qualified individual because there was no
amount of accommodation that would allow him to perform the existing job. 12
The court then agreed to rehear the ADA claim en banc.
The Tenth Circuit took a similar approach to the D.C. Circuit. The
court focused on language defining a qualified individual as one who "can
perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual
holds or desires." ' 13 The court reasoned that Midland Brake could not limit its
consideration of the accommodation to the position Smith currently held, but
that it had to consider his qualifications for another position or else the word
"desires" would be meaningless within the statute. 114 The panel then cited
directly to the D.C. Circuit's decision in Aka, quoting the opinion's language
that reassignment must mean something more than being considered on the
same basis as other individuals. 115 The majority specifically rejected the dissent
of Judge Paul Joseph Kelly, Jr., who contended that the ADA only required
equal treatment for the disabled individual. 116 The majority found this
interpretation too narrow, namely because it would undercut the literal meaning
of the statute and would render the reassignment provision a "nullity." 17 Thus,
the panel concluded that the employer was required to provide reassignment to
a vacant position as a reasonable accommodation, regardless of whether there

108

Id.

109

Id.

110

Id.

III

Id.

112

Id.

113

Id. at 1161 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2012)).

114

id.
Id. at 164; see also Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Center, 156 F.3d 1284, 1304 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en

115

banc).
116

See Smith, 180 F.3d at 1164.

117

Id. In both Aka and Midland Brake, the courts used this language to argue that the

reasonable accommodation provision must provide more to the disabled employee than mere
consideration of a transfer.
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with superior qualifications who was interested in the job
was an individual
18
position.
The Tenth Circuit went a step further than Aka by stating that the
employee had a right to the reassignment if he was qualified and defining what
more was required rather than just being considered on equal footing with other
non-disabled applicants.1 19 The majority read the statute as clearly placing an
obligation upon the employer to reassign the disabled employee, regardless of
superior candidates, and stated:
[A]n employer discriminates against a qualified individual with
a disability if the employer fails to offer a reasonable
accommodation. If no reasonable accommodation can keep the
employee in his or her existing job, then the reasonable
accommodation may require reassignment to a vacant position
so long as the employee is qualified for the job and it does not
impose an undue burden on the employer. Anything more,
such as requiring the reassigned employee to be the best
qualified employee for the vacant job, is judicial gloss
unwarranted by the statutory language or its legislative
history. 120
Judge Kelly's dissent echoed the dissents in Aka. Looking at the
statute, he concluded that reassignment should not be mandated because the
language stipulated that reasonable accommodations "may include"
reassignment or other options.1 2 1 He also looked to the legislative history to
conclude that Congress could not have intended for the employer to lose some
of its discretionary power in hiring decisions.122 Judge Kelly determined that
Congress had made it "abundantly clear" that if a person could "perform the
essential functions of the vacant job with or without reasonable
accommodation," then the person should be treated equally "without regard to
disability, perceived or otherwise." 123 He further stated, "[c]ourts must resist
the temptation to 'improve' upon Congress's work." 124 The dissent also
touched briefly on the rights of employers explaining, "We should be wary of
will affect employer
adopting a reassignment right that unquestionably
125
operations and the rights of other employees."

1'

Id. at 1167.

119

122

See Befort & Donesky, supra note 23, at 1068.
Smith, 180 F.3d at 1169; Befort & Donesky, supra note 23, at 1068 (footnote omitted).
See Smith, 180 F.3d at 1180-81 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
Id. Judge Kelly cited to the same House Report as did the dissents in Aka.

123

Id.

124

Id.

125

Id. at 1183. This notion will be further explored in Part IV.

120
121
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3. The Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit only recently held that reassignment is mandated
under the ADA. 126 Since 2000, the Seventh Circuit had relied on EEOC v.
Humiston-Keeling, Inc. as its binding precedent on the matter of
reassignment. 127 However, after the Supreme Court's Barnett decision, the
Seventh Circuit shifted its position in 2012.128
In 2000, the Seventh Circuit heard arguments in EEOC v. HumistonKeeling, Inc. 129 The plaintiff, Nancy Cook Houser, alleged that her employer
failed to accommodate her tennis elbow condition. 130 Houser worked as a
warehouse picker, which required her to carry pharmaceutical products and
frequently lift up to five pounds. 13 ' The employer recognized that it had an
obligation to accommodate her disability and made attempts to meet her
needs. 132 However, these attempts were futile and Houser subsequently applied
for several vacant clerical positions within the company for which she was
minimally qualified.133 She was passed over for these positions in favor of
34
more qualified candidates. 1
Judge Richard Posner's opinion disagreed with the EEOC's argument
that the ADA required an employer to reassign a disabled employee over a
more qualified candidate.' 35 Posner stressed that Houser's disability "had
nothing to do with the office jobs for which she applied" or the employer's
decision not to hire her. 136 He also specifically mentioned both Aka and Smith,
distinguishing Aka and rejecting Smith because it was inconsistent with Seventh
Circuit precedent. 37 His major contention was that there was a major
difference, "one of principle and not merely of cost, between requiring
employers to clear away obstacles to hiring the best applicant for the job...
126

See Julie Beck, ADA Requires Reassignment as a Reasonable Accommodation for
Disabled Employees: 7th Circuit Reverses Its Own Precedent in EEOC v. United Airlines,

(Nov. 28, 2012), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2012/l1/28/ada-requiresreassignment-as-a-reasonable-acconmmod.
127
See id.
INSIDECOtNSEL

128
129

See id.; see also EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc., 693 F.3d 760 (7th Cir.
2012).
227 F.3d 1024 (7th Cir. 2000).

"'

See id. at 1026.

131 Id.
132 Id. The defendant attempted to make an arm sling so that she could carry the products with

less stress on her elbow, but she gave up on the sling after only a few hours, leading to questions
of whether she gave it a fair shot. Id.
133

Id. at 1026-27.

134

See id.

135
136

See id. at 1029; see also Concannon, supra note 1, at 626-27.
Humiston-Keeling, 227 F.3d at 1027.

137

Id. at 1028.
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and requiring employers to hire [minimally qualified] applicants merely
group.', 138 This, he said, would be
because they are members of [a protected]
' ' 39
vengeance.
a
with
action
"affirmative
Nonetheless, the Seventh Circuit switched gears in 2012 when it
decided EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc. 140 The plaintiff, Joe Boswell, worked as
a mechanic for United Airlines at the San Francisco International Airport for
over a decade before he was diagnosed with a brain tumor.14 ' When it was
determined that he no longer could perform the functions of the mechanic
position, Boswell applied for several other vacant positions for which he was
minimally qualified.142 However, he was turned down for all of these positions
and was eventually placed on involuntary leave. 43 Even though United Airlines
had Reasonable Accommodation Guidelines that gave disabled employees
preferential treatment, 144 the EEOC filed suit on behalf of Boswell in San
Francisco (the case was transferred to Illinois upon United Airlines' motion). 145
The district court granted United Airlines' motion to dismiss, citing
Humiston-Keeling as binding precedent. 146 Initially, the court of appeals
affirmed the decision of the district court, citing Humiston-Keeling and several
other Seventh Circuit cases decided after Barnett.147 However, the court of
appeals granted a rehearing to decide the question of whether HumistonKeeling and other post-Barnett cases were still viable interpretations of the
ADA.

148

Upon rehearing, the Seventh Circuit began its analysis by noting that
that relied on Humiston-Keeling did not conduct a detailed analysis
courts
the
of that decision's validity post-Barnett.149 The court relied on the two-step test
set out in Barnett and the decision's interpretation that disabled individuals

... Id. at 1028-29.
139 Id. at 1029 (emphasis added).
693 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2012).
140
Concannon, supra note 1,at 617.
141
142

See id.

143

Id.
See id.at 616. United Airlines adopted Reasonable Accommodations Guidelines in 2003 to
address disabled employees who could no longer perform the essential functions of their current
jobs even with an accommodation. The Guidelines stipulated that the disabled employee could
submit an unlimited number of applications, the employee was guaranteed an interview, and the
employee would receive priority consideration over a similarly qualified candidate; however, the
disabled employee was not to be automatically given the position. United Airlines, 693 F.3d at
761.
145 United Airlines, 693 F.3d at 761.
Id.
146
Concannon, supra note 1, at 618.
147
See UnitedAirlines, 693 F.3d at 760-61.
148
144

141

Id. at 761.
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were entitled to a preference under the ADA. 150 The court also noted that one of
its previous decisions, Mays v. Principi,151 had actually found that Barnett
"bolster[ed] Humiston-Keeling by equating seniority systems with any other
normal method of filling vacancies."' 52 However, this court found that Mays
incorrectly asserted that a best-qualified hiring process was the same as a
seniority system. 153 The court supported this conclusion by finding that
"[w]hile employers may prefer to hire the best qualified applicant, the violation
of a best-qualified selection policy does not involve the property-rights and
' 54
administrative concerns ... presented by the violation of a seniority policy."'
Thus, in light of its findings, the Seventh Circuit explicitly overruled HumistonKeeling and held that the "ADA does indeed mandate that an employer appoint
' 5
employees with disabilities to vacant positions for which they are qualified."' 1
4. Policy of Mandating Reassignment as a Reasonable
Accommodation
The Seventh, Tenth, and D.C. Circuit Courts' decisions are rooted in
their interpretation that the ADA's purpose is to provide disabled employees
something more than the opportunity to compete with other individuals for a
vacant position. This interpretation falls within guidelines issued by the
EEOC.' 56 The EEOC has taken a strong stance on the issue by explicitly stating
in its guidelines that reassignment does not include competing for a job and that
reassignment would be of little value if a disabled employee would have to
compete for a vacant position. 157 The guidelines further state that an employer
must modify its policy if it does not allow any employees to transfer from one
position to another in order to satisfy its reasonable accommodation
requirement, unless the employer could show that modification to the policy
58
would create an undue hardship.
These circuits have also focused on the meaning of the word "reassign"
to find support for mandating reassignment. In Aka, the court stated that the

150

See id. at 762-63.

151 301 F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 2002).
152 United Airlines, 693 F.3d at 763-64. As mentioned above, Barnett held that violation of

established seniority systems would normally be unreasonable in the run of cases. US Airways,
Inc., v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 403 (2002).
153 United Airlines, 693 F.3d at 764.
154

Id.

115 Id. at 761.
156

See generally ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 47.

157

Id.

158

id.
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"core word 'assign' implies some active effort on the part of the employer." 159
An employee who applied for and obtains a job elsewhere in the business
60
would not be thought to be reassigned in the normal sense of the word. 1 The
courts also relied on the literal reading of the word "reassignment" to find
support in their argument that the ADA's prohibition against preferences for
disabled applicants does not apply to existing employees, only to new
applicants. These courts found that if Congress had intended for disabled
employees to be treated exactly like other applicants, then there would be no
need for the statutory language to further explain that employers had no
obligation to bump another employee or for the statute to discuss a disabled
job applicant separately.' 6' Otherwise, the statute
employee and a disabled
62
would be redundant. 1

C. Circuits that Have Construedthe ADA To Allow for Best-Qualified
HiringPracticeswhen Reassigning DisabledIndividuals
Federal circuits that support the employer's right to impose a meritbased hiring policy include the Eighth, Fifth, and Fourth Circuits. There is also
circuits, but this Note will
support for merit-based policies to prevail in other
63
focus on the Eighth, Fifth, and Fourth Circuits. 1
1. The Eighth Circuit
Pam Huber worked for Wal-Mart in Arkansas as a dry grocery order
filler when she sustained an injury to her right arm and hand, which prevented
her from performing the essential functions of her job. 164 Due to her disability,
Huber requested to be reassigned to a router position, which was deemed
vacant.165 Wal-Mart did not agree to automatically reassign Huber to the router
position because it had a policy of hiring the most qualified applicant for vacant
159 Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Center, 156 F.3d 1284, 1304 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
Id.
160
161

See Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1164 (10th Cir. 1999); Aka, 156 F.3d at

1304.
162

Aka, 156 F.3d at 1304.

See Hedrick v. W. Reserve Care Sys. and Forum Health, 355 F.3d 444 (6th Cir. 2004)
(holding that while an employer may have an obligation to reassign an employee to a vacant
163

position for which she is qualified, the ADA does not mandate that she be afforded preferential
treatment); Terrell v. USAIR, 132 F.3d 621, 627 (11th Cir. 1998) ("We cannot accept that
Congress, in enacting the ADA, intended to grant preferential treatment for disabled workers.");
Wernick v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 91 F.3d 379 (2d Cir. 1996) ("[T]he Fed did not have an
affirmative duty to provide [Wernick] with a job for which she was qualified; it only had an
obligation to treat her in the same manner that it treated other similarly qualified candidates.").
164 Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 486 F.3d 480, 481 (8th Cir. 2007).
165

Id.
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positions; thus, Huber would have to compete against other candidates for the
position. 166 Wal-Mart ultimately filled the position with another, non-disabled
candidate, reassigning Huber to a maintenance associate position. 67 Wal-Mart
found that Huber was not the most qualified candidate for the job and hired the
more qualified candidate to fill the router position. 68 Huber subsequently filed
suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas
alleging that Wal-Mart failed to provide her with a reasonable accommodation
169
by not giving her the router position.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals relied heavily on the Seventh
Circuit's decision in Humiston-Keeling to determine that Wal-Mart did not
have a duty to automatically reassign a disabled employee to a vacant
position. 7 The court cited language from Humiston-Keeling that decisions
based upon the merits of the candidates are not discriminatory and to hold
otherwise would convert a non-discrimination statute into an affirmative action
statute. 171 The Eighth Circuit also cited to Barnett to bolster its decision,
focusing on language where the Court held that an employer is normally not
required to give a disabled employee higher seniority status in order to retain
his position when there is another candidate with higher seniority status. 172
Thus, the court found that an employer was not required to
automatically reassign a disabled employee to a position for which a more
qualified candidate was applying. 173 The court concluded that doing so would
be affirmative action for the disabled employees, which is not what Congress
intended the ADA to provide. The court further held that Wal-Mart did in fact
accommodate Huber by reassigning her to a maintenance associate position,
supported by earlier decisions that found an employer does not have a duty to
174
reassign the employee to the position of his choice.
2.

The Fifth Circuit

In an earlier ADA case, Carl Daugherty brought suit against the city of
El Paso, Texas, for failing to reassign him to a vacant position when he became
an insulin-dependent diabetic.17 5 Daugherty was working in a permanent

166

Id.

167

Id.

168

Id.

169

Id. at 482.
Id. at 483.
See id.
Id. at 484.

170
171
172

173

Id.

174

Id.

175

Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695 (5th Cir. 1995).
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position as a part-time bus driver when he was removed from that position due
to his diabetes. 176 Daugherty was then placed on leave and was referred to the
77
city's personnel office in order to find another position. 1 The city claimed that
the
it offered Daugherty a toll booth position, but he turned it down because 178
position.
the
offered
never
was
he
that
pay was too low; Daugherty claimed
The court found that the city offered Daugherty several positions, or
the opportunity to obtain several positions, but that Daugherty was unwilling to
take many of those offers.179 It was also unclear to what extent Daugherty was
qualified for many of the positions that he sought to apply for at the personnel
office. The city director of personnel stated that many of the positions that
Daugherty wanted to apply for were full-time positions that he was not
qualified for or would have required the city to violate its own rules and
have opened the city up to liability from other employees
policies, which would
80
and candidates. 1
The Fifth Circuit found that Daugherty's claim failed because he was
unable to show that he was treated any differently than any other part-time
employee whose job was eliminated. 181 The court cited to the statutory
language, emphasizing that the plain language states that a reasonable
accommodation "may include" reassignm3ent to a vacant position.18 The court
also relied on a Rehabilitation Act case' 83 and analogized that the city was not
required to fundamentally alter its policies or programs to accommodate a
disabled employee. 184 However, the main thrust of the court's decision rested
on the fact that Daugherty was not treated any differently than any other
employee who lost his position. The court found that perhaps the city could
alter its policies to be more lenient for all employees, but that Daugherty had
failed to show that the city's alleged unwillingness to provide him with another
185
The court concluded by
job was discriminatory against his disability.
explicitly stating that the ADA does not require affirmative action in favor of
individuals with disabilities by giving priority to disabled employees in hiring
or reassignment over those who are not disabled. The ADA only prohibits

176

Id. at 696. The city did not have many full-time positions.

171

Id. at 699.
Id.

178
179
180
181
182

id.
Id.
Id. at 700.
Id. at 698.

The Rehabilitation Act is the primary predecessor to the ADA. The Daugherty court relied
on Chiari v. City of League City, 920 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1991), which held that a defendant was
not required to fundamentally alter its practices to accommodate a disabled employee.
Daugherty, 56 F.3d at 700.
184
183

185

Id.
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discrimination
against qualified individuals with disabilities, "no more and no
186
less."

3. The Fourth Circuit
Like Barnett,EEOC v. Sara Lee Corp. 187 arose amidst a dispute over a
seniority system. However, the Fourth Circuit supplied some comments that
would likely apply in this context. Vanessa Turpin was an employee for Sara
Lee in its Florence, South Carolina, plant when she began to suffer from
epilepsy. 188 Her condition often affected her sleep patterns and sometimes
occurred while she was working, but she was still able to care for her child and
continue working after a seizure occurred. 189 However, when Sara Lee shut
down its plant in another South Carolina town, it offered those employees the
opportunity to transfer to the Florence plant while maintaining their current
seniority status. 190 An employee with 20 years of seniority wanted to work
during Turpin's shift, which meant Turpin would have to move to another shift
later in the day or night.' 9' Sara Lee, in light of the longstanding seniority
policy and its doctor's opinion that moving shifts would not affect Turpin's
sleep patterns,' 92 decided not to accommodate Turpin by allowing her to retain
her position
on the first shift. Turpin subsequently accepted a severance
93
package.1
Turpin filed suit, claiming that Sara Lee had failed to reasonably
accommodate her. The Fourth Circuit found that she was not disabled within
the meaning of the ADA and that even if she was, Sara Lee had not failed in its
duty to reasonably accommodate her. 194 The court found that violating a
seniority policy would be unreasonable. The court further stated that an
employer is not required by the ADA to violate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory policy.' 95 Here, the court reasoned that violating a legitimate,
non-discriminatory policy "tramples on the rights" of other, non-disabled

188

Id.
237 F.3d 349 (4th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 351.

189

Id.

190

Id.

191

Id.

186

187

Turpin attempted to stay on the first shift by producing a note from her doctor that a shift
change would significantly affect her sleep patterns and thus, worsen her seizures. Id. Sara Lee's
doctor opined that a shift change would not significantly affect her sleep patterns unless she
worked on a rotating schedule, which did not seem to be what would happen. Id.
192

193

Id.at 351.

... Id.at 352-53.
115 Id. at 355.
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employees. 196 The court found that the policy was a neutral method of
to know
resolving sensitive questions in the workplace and allowed all workers
197
made.
were
decisions
company
any
before
game"
the "rules of the
Recently, the Fourth Circuit left open the question of whether an
employer was obligated to reassign a disabled employee over a more qualified
candidate. 198 In Jackson v. Fujifilm Manufacturing USA Inc., Timothy Jackson
was hired as a manufacturing technician in a factory that produced
photographic paper. 199 Five years later, the employer announced that it was
closing Jackson's factory and that employees could either accept a severance
package or opt to remain with the company to be reassigned through the
200
employer's reassignment policy. Jackson announced to the employer that he

had a permanent disability due to a motor vehicle accident in which he was
involved 13 years prior, 2°as well as an injury he suffered in 2006.202 He was
2 3
reassigned to another position but also applied for several other positions.
Jackson did not receive any of the other positions he applied for because the
2°
employer decided to hire individuals who were more qualified.
The district court ruled against Jackson and granted the employer's
motion for summary judgment.20 5 The court found that Jackson did not produce
sufficient evidence that he was actually disabled and that he did not produce
sufficient evidence that he was more qualified than the individuals who were
hired ahead of him.20 6 Upon appeal to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, the
court affirmed the district court's ruling based upon its finding that Jackson
20 7
failed to show that he was adequately disabled under the ADA. The court
reasoned that he did not present sufficient evidence to show that he was
substantially limited in a major life activity.20 8 Thus, because it dismissed the

196

Id.

197

Id. at 354-55.

198

See Jackson v. Fujifilm Mfg. USA, Inc., 447 F. App'x. 515 (4th Cir. 2011).
Jackson v. Fujifilm Mfg. USA, Inc., No. 8:09-1328-RBH-BHH, 2010 WL 5778218, at *1

199

(D.S.C. June 18, 2010).
200

Id.

Id. Jackson told his employer when he was hired that he suffered a fractured hip in a 1991
motor vehicle accident and a fractured femur in a 1993 motor vehicle accident. However, he
apparently did not announce that these were permanent impairments until the employer decided
to close the factory in 2006.
Id. at *2.
202
201

203

Id.

204

See id.

205

Id. at *10.
Id. at *7-10.

206
207

208

Jackson v. Fujifilm Mfg. USA, Inc., 447 F. App'x. 515 (4th Cir. 2011).
Id.
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claim based on his failure to show he was disabled under the ADA, the court
did not rule upon Jackson's claim that his employer failed to reasonably
accommodate him.20 9 Subsequently, the Fourth Circuit did not weigh in on the
debate of whether an employer is mandated to reassign a minimally qualified
disabled employee over a more qualified, non-disabled employee.21 0
4. Policy Arguments Against Mandating Reassignment
The Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits all touch on the same basic
notion that employers should not be forced to violate or disregard legitimate,
non-discriminatory policies in order to accommodate a minimally qualified
disabled employee. These circuits opine that mandating reassignment in
violation of a non-discriminatory policy is essentially affirmative action that
would create reverse discrimination against non-disabled employees or
applicants. A mandate could also have severe repercussions against the
employer from other employees by creating unstable working environments or
211
increasing the likelihood that a lawsuit will be brought against the employer.
The courts opine that all workers in a company rely on non-discriminatory
policies and the ADA should not force employers to penalize employees free
from disability in order to vindicate the rights of disabled workers.21 2
Essentially, these courts focus their arguments around the rights of
other employees and the employers, whereas the courts that favor automatic
reassignment focus their arguments on the rights of the disabled employee. The
former circuits reject the idea that a minimally qualified disabled employee
should receive an open position over a more qualified, non-disabled employee
solely on the basis of being in a protected class. These circuits have instead
adopted the notion that mandating automatic reassignment in the face of a
legitimate, non-discriminatory policy would be unreasonable. Citing to
legislative history and to the statute, these circuits have found that the ADA
only seeks to place disabled persons on the same footing as all other employees
or job candidates. As stated in Sara Lee, allowing a disabled employee to
violate a legitimate, non-discriminatory policy would "convert a
nondiscrimination statute into a mandatory preference statute, a result which
would be both inconsistent with the nondiscriminatory aims of the ADA and an

29

See id.

See Marshall v. AT&T Mobility, 793 F. Supp. 2d 761 (D.S.C. 2011) (noting that the Fourth
Circuit has not specifically addressed the issue and holding that the defendant's failure to award
the plaintiff an open position as an accommodation was not in itself a violation).
210

211

See Alex B. Long, The ADA 's Reasonable Accommodation Requirement and "Innocent

Third Parties," 68 Mo. L. REV. 863, 871-73 (2003). In Sara Lee, the court recognized that in

South Carolina, a claim of breach of implied contract based on employer policies was available
for third parties.
212 See EEOC v. Sara Lee Corp., 237 F.3d 349, 355 (4th Cir. 2001).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2014

25

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 117, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 9
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 117

unreasonable imposition on the employers and coworkers of disabled
employees. '21 3
IV. THE ADA SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED TO MANDATE EMPLOYERS TO
AUTOMATICALLY REASSIGN A MINIMALLY QUALIFIED DISABLED INDIVIDUAL
TO A VACANT POSITION OVER A MORE QUALIFIED INDIVIDUAL

The view of the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, which have interpreted the
ADA to not mandate reassignment, correctly interpret the statute as only an
equal opportunity provider. The legislative history, impact on third parties, and
the burden on the employers indicate that Congress did not intend for the
statute to force employers to assign preferential treatment to disabled
employees. Thus, the ADA should not be construed as mandating reassignment
of minimally qualified disabled employees over more qualified individuals.
A. Legislative History Does Not Indicate that Congress Intendedfor a
Mandate
The legislative history of the ADA has been cited for support by both
sides of this argument. However, interpreting the statute as mandating
reassignment misses the mark. In several instances, Congress has made clear
that an employer still has discretion to choose who it will hire for a vacant
position.2 14 The legislative history of the ADA specifically states that Congress
did not intend to limit the ability of "covered entities to choose and maintain a
qualified workforce. 2 15 Moreover, Congress specifically stated that the
covered employers do not have an obligation to prefer applicants with
disabilities over other applicants on the basis of disability.2 16 Congress also
stated that the employer's obligation is to consider applicants without regard to
disability, or the "individual's need for a reasonable
an individual's 217
accommodation.,
While the ADA contemplates employers taking actions in order to put
disabled individuals on an equal playing field with other, non-disabled
individuals, preferential treatment is not consistent with the fundamental idea
of the statute.21 8 Several congressmen even spoke of the statute not establishing
preferential treatment for disabled individuals during the floor debates.
Congressman Steny Hoyer stated that the "bill does not guarantee a job--or

214

Id. (quoting Dalton v. Subaru-Izuzu Automotive, Inc., 141 F.3d 667, 679 (7th Cir. 1998)).
See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445.

215

Id. at 35-36.

216

Id.

213

217 Id. pt. 2, at 56.

Thomas F. O'Neil, III & Kenneth M. Reiss, Reassigning Disabled Employees Under the
ADA: Preferences Under the Guise of Equality?, 17 LAB. LAW. 347, 359 (2001).
218
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anything else. It guarantees a level playing field. 21 Moreover, Congressman
Don Edwards stated that the "ADA does not require an employer to hire
unqualified persons, nor does it require employers to give preference to persons
with disabilities. 220 In this light, it cannot be said that Congress intended for
disabled individuals to be automatically reassigned over more qualified
candidates when the employer follows a merit-based hiring policy. Nothing in
the legislative history suggests that Congress intended to take away an
employer's ability to implement a legitimate, non-discriminatory policy for
choosing the most qualified candidate for a vacant position, even where a
person is seeking a reasonable accommodation through reassignment.
The fact that reassignment is meant to be considered as an
accommodation of last resort is also indicative that Congress did not intend for
mandated reassignment. 221 Congress merely intended for reassignment to be
considered as an option for accommodation, and it should only be contemplated
when all other accommodations are not possible.222 The Congressional
Committee that drafted the statute commented that a reasonable
accommodation may include reassignment, not that it was required.223 The
statute does not read that reasonable accommodations "shall include
reassignment to a vacant position., 224 If reassignment, or any of the other
proposed accommodations, is mandatory, the words "may include" would
essentially be meaningless within the framework of the ADA.225
Several courts have attempted to distinguish an existing disabled
employee from other applicants to a vacant position,22 6 but the statutory
language does not support a blanket prohibition. The A/ca and Smith majorities
attempted to make this distinction by stating that had Congress intended for
disabled employees to be treated like other applicants, there would be no need
to explain that bumping another employee out of a position to create a vacancy
was not necessary. 22 Essentially, the courts argued that Congress must have
intended to confer additional rights to existing employees as opposed to
applicants. However, Judge Kelly's dissent in Smith offered lengthy discussion
219 Sandra R. Levitsky, Reasonably Accommodating Race: Lessons from the ADA for RaceTargetedAffirmative Action, 18 LAW & INEQ. 85, 113 (2000).

Id.
221 Flores, supra note 5, at 240-41.
220

222 Id.

223 See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 63 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 345.
224 Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1183-84 (10th Cir. 1999) (Kelly, J.,
dissenting).
225 Id.; Jennifer Beale, Affirmative Action and Violation of Union Contracts: The EEOC's New
Requirements Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 811, 823-25

(2002).
226 See Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1304 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Smith, 180 F.3d 1154.
227

Aka, 156 F.3d at 1304.
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on this issue. Judge Kelly pointed out that this was not the case because the
provision was meant to prevent the employer from imposing blanket bans on
reassignment and it prevents an employer from automatically deeming a
disabled employee unqualified because of his disability. 228 Moreover,
attempting to distinguish between an existing employee and merely an
applicant leaves open the question of how an employer should proceed when
employees (as is often the case).
both candidates are
r221 Under the Smith
. . existing
..
majority rationale, this creates a catch-22 for the employer.
B. Effect on Third Parties
In the majority opinion of Barnett, Justice Breyer alluded to an
accommodation being unreasonable because of its effect on third parties, i.e.,
fellow employees. 23° The Court stated that one way for a plaintiff to show that
his requested reassignment was reasonable in the face of a seniority system was
to show that coworkers had low expectations of equal treatment under the
policy. 231 By mandating reassignment for the disabled employee, the interests
of fellow employees are necessarily affected. Any other employee who sought
to transfer into the vacant position would feel unfairly slighted because they
were not chosen for the position because another candidate was disabled. The
ADA was enacted in order for disabled individuals to have an equal
opportunity to establish themselves in the American workforce and not to be
excluded based upon their disability. The ADA did not set out to disadvantage
non-disabled persons.232 However, if the statute is read to mandate
reassignment of disabled individuals to vacant positions over more qualified
non-disabled individuals, that is exactly what the Act would do; it would place
non-disabled individuals at a disadvantage in certain circumstances.
Some courts have discussed the notion that disruption of the workplace
or lowering of employee morale could be sufficient to create an undue
hardship.2 33 While these courts note that the employee morale would have to be
significantly affected for the issue to amount to an undue hardship, it is not
difficult to imagine a situation where this would be the case. For example,
assume an employer has a vacancy available and the employer has a policy of

228
229
230

Smith, 180 F.3d at 1184 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
This idea will be explored more in Section IV.
US Airways, Inc., v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 400-01 (2002).

Gould, Living in Harmony? Reasonable
Accommodations, Employee Expectations, and US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 20 HOFSTRA LAB. &
EMP. L.J. 345, 359 (2003).
212
H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445.
See Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180, 1190 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Holt v. Olmstead Twp. Bd. of
233
231

Sandy Andrikopoulos

& Theo E. M.

Trustees, 43 F. Supp. 2d 812, 824 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (quoting Draper v. U.S. Pipe and Foundry,
Co., 527 F.2d 515 (6th Cir. 1975)).
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hiring the most qualified candidate. It is generally common for employers to
post vacancies for all employees to apply if they wish to be considered. For
whatever reason, several non-disabled employees put in applications for the
vacancy. It can be inferred that for whatever their various reasons are, the
candidates each find the vacant position to be better in some way. However, the
candidates are all denied the position because an inferior candidate obtained the
position based upon his requested accommodation. The non-disabled
individuals may still have a job, but the company morale could be so low in the
future that it adversely affects the business. Employees could lack incentive to
produce and succeed or may have to work harder or longer in order to subsidize
for the disabled employee's lower productivity. The employees could become
very hostile to the disabled individual, which would affect his performance on
the job. The situation could lead to disruption within the workplace that would
make it extremely difficult for the business to operate successfully.
To expand upon the previous point, some courts have held that any
accommodation that requires co-employees to work harder or longer is
unreasonable.23 4 For example, assume a disabled employee cannot perform the
essential functions of his current position because of a bad back and he seeks
reassignment. The employer has a vacant position in its factory packing
products. The bulk of the job requires the employee, along with a small team of
other employees, to pack the products onto a pallet, though every few hours,
the pallet gets full and has to be moved for an empty one to take its place.
Normally, the team members take turns pushing the loaded pallet to the loading
dock.235 The disabled employee can pack the products without any assistance,
but he cannot push the loaded pallet due to his condition. Under the approach
taken by circuits that have found reassignment mandatory, the disabled
individual would likely have to be given the position, even over a non-disabled
candidate, because the burden on the other employees in the team might be
seen as minimal. Those circuits likely would require the non-disabled team
members to work harder and longer in order to compensate for the disabled
individual's inability to move the palette because it would be seen as a small
part of the job.236
The above scenario highlights a situation where non-disabled
employees might become very disgruntled with the employer, leading to low
morale or hostility to the disabled individual because of higher workloads. But

234

Nicole Buonocore Porter, Martinizing Title I of the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 47 GA.

L. REv. 527, 574 (2013) (citing Rehrs v. lams Co., 486 F.3d 353, 357 (8th Cir. 2007); Turco v.
Hoechst Celanese Corp., 101 F.3d 1090, 1094 (5th Cir. 1996); Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d
1118, 1125 (10th Cir. 1995)).
235
Porter, supra note 234, at 573-74.
236
See Miller v. Ill. Dep't of Transp., 643 F.3d 190 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that it was
reasonable for members of a team to substitute for the disabled worker where the worker was
only unable to perform 3% of the job).
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what about a situation where the safety of other employees is put in jeopardy
because an employer was forced to transfer a minimally qualified disabled
individual over a more qualified, non-disabled person? What if the disabled
employee sought reassignment into a position in a chemical factory or a steel
production facility where the work is inherently more dangerous? Experience
on the job often leads to increased safety precautions by employees, which
leads to elevated safety for other employees. It would be detrimental to other
employees, and cut against their right to a safe working environment, to force
the employer to hire a minimally qualified, less experienced individual.
On the other hand, allowing an employer to maintain a legitimate, nondiscriminatory policy of hiring the most qualified candidate based upon the
merits of individuals would avoid many of the problems that mandatory
reassignment would bring to third parties. An employer's policy to hire the
most qualified candidate allows for other employees to develop legitimate
expectations in the policy's provisions.2 37 Consistent application of these
policies promotes fairness and predictability, while also creating incentives
within the workplace.2 38 Thus, allowing employers to maintain neutral policies
allows the employer to preserve a stable working environment. All things
equal, an employer would generally not offer a minimally qualified candidate a
position when more qualified candidates have applied. Employees would not
expect for this to be the case. The ADA prohibits the employer from
discriminating against a disabled employee in the terms and conditions of his
employment based upon his disability.2 9 Yet by mandating that an employer
ignore a neutral policy to hire the most qualified candidate, the rights to equal
treatment in the terms and conditions of non-disabled employees would be
discriminated against because of another person's disability. If, as Congress has
stated, the purpose of the reasonable accommodation requirement is to allow
for equal employment opportunity, then the rights and interests of non-disabled
employees should not be of secondary importance. The rights and interests of
the non-disabled and the disabled alike should be equal.24 °
It is clear that Congress intended for both employers and non-disabled
employees to bear some burden when it enacted the ADA to allow disabled
individuals more opportunity. 241 However, it is unlikely that Congress intended
for non-disabled employees to bear such a burden that could affect their own
livelihoods. A policy of hiring the most qualified applicant is not

240

Befort & Donesky, supra note 23, at 1092.
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012).
Long, supra note 211, at 899.

241

See id.

237
238

239
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discriminatory. 242 In today's world, many positions require workers that have
undergone certain specialized training, often at great expense to the individual.
It would cut against the equal opportunity goals of the ADA for the candidate,
disabled or not, with exceptional credentials to be turned away simply because
another candidate is unable to perform in his current position. The other
candidate has a reason for seeking that position-perhaps it pays more money,
perhaps the shift occurs at a more desirable time of the day, or perhaps it would
be more challenging and fulfilling for that person-yet he would be turned
down for the position only on the basis that another candidate has a
disability.243 Congress intended for the ADA to put disabled individuals on
equal footing with non-disabled individuals. 244 The ADA acts as a shield
against discrimination for those who are disabled; 245 it should not be used to
unreasonably exclude an unprotected group of individuals from opportunity.
C. Burden on the Employer Is Unreasonable
Often, an accommodation will have a relatively minor effect on the
246
operation of the employer's business and will be relatively inexpensive.
However, the notion of mandated reassignment to a vacant position over a
more qualified candidate combines both financial and administrative aspects
that unreasonably burden the employer. The most basic of these burdens is the
employer's right to choose and maintain a qualified workforce that it believes
will be the most productive and successful for business operations.
Mandating reassignment over a more qualified candidate impinges
upon management's overall flexibility and productivity in the workplace. 2W It
cuts against the ideal of a free market society by forcing employers to maintain
a less economically efficient workforce.2 48 Requiring an employer to reassign a
disabled employee to a vacant position over a more qualified individual is
tantamount to requiring the employer to lower its workplace standards.

242
Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 486 F.3d 480 (8th Cir. 2007); O'Neil & Reiss, supra note
218, at 360.
243
See Flores, supranote 5, at 48.

See Huber, 486 F.3d at 484.
EEOC v. Sara Lee Corp., 237 F.3d 349, 356 (4th Cir. 2001).
246
See generally Sandra K. Collins & Eric P. Matthews, Americans with Disability Act:
FinancialAspects of Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship, 39 J. OF HEALTH CARE
FINANCE 79 (2012). Accommodations generally will consist of altering work stations or other
physical aspects of the workplace that are inexpensive to put in place.
247
Stephen F. Befort, Reasonable Accommodation and Reassignment Under the Americans
with DisabilitiesAct: Answers, Questions, and Suggested Solutions After U.S. Airways, Inc. v.
Barnett, 45 ARIz. L. REV. 931, 946 (2003).
248
See PETER DAVID BLANCK, EMPLOYMENT, DISABILITY, AND THE AMERICANS WITH
244
245

DISABILITIES ACT: ISSUES IN LAW, PUBLIC POLICY, AND RESEARCH
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Employers will usually seek out the most qualified candidate for any position
that becomes vacant, not simply the first qualified candidate that comes along.
Economically, this is common sense. Employers invest in the people that they
hire, an investment that they intend will produce dividends for them in the
future. 24 9 It is very likely that by hiring a less qualified individual for a position,
disabled or not, the employer will see less return on this investment, thus
harming the employer in the short and long term. 250 A less qualified candidate
will likely not be as productive, thereby depriving the employer of his expected
return on the investment made. This would likely be exacerbated by prolonged
tenure in the position by the inferior candidate. 21 Denying the employer the
opportunity to hire the most qualified individual deprives it of the ability of
highly trained employees who may have more years of experience than the less
qualified individuals.2 52 Thus, as a matter of sound business principles, an
employer should not be required to reassign a less qualified individual over a
more qualified individual.
These basic business principles are accentuated in times of economic
downturn, especially for smaller businesses that fall within the purview of the
ADA. Smaller businesses often struggle to stay afloat during difficult economic
conditions and they seek to maintain the most efficient workforce for minimal
costs. In a time when the business is struggling to make ends meet, the
employer is saddled with a less productive work force that is detrimental not
only to the employer, but potentially to other employees if the employer is
forced to make further cost reductions. Even in a strong economy, an employer
may be compelled to reduce costs in other areas of the business in order to
compensate for the lack of production from the less qualified disabled
employee. This is unreasonable.
One basic assumption that underlies much of the ADA is that disabled
individuals have difficulty obtaining new positions because of their disabilities
and many negative stereotypes that accompany them.253 Proponents of
mandatory reassignment reason that the non-disabled individual will have more
opportunities to seek other positions.2 54 However, lost in this reasoning is the
effect that passing over a more qualified candidate has on the employer itself.
The employer could potentially lose the non-disabled candidate if he decides to
leave the business for perceived unfairness. Due to ADA confidentiality rules,
249

See Seth D. Harris, Law, Economics, and Accommodations in the Internal Labor Market,

10 U. PA. J. Bus. & EMP. L. 1, 25 (2007).
250
See id.
251 See id.
252
253

254

Befort, supra note 247, at 946.
H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445.
Befort & Donesky, supra note 23, at 1089. This presumption also ignores the increasing

specialization of the workforce, which makes it more difficult for non-disabled individuals to
move from job to job.
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the employer is not allowed to disclose that an employee has a disability or that
a more qualified candidate was passed over because of the other person's
disability. 55 The mistreated employee might stay in his position, but negative
effects on workplace morale could be pervasive, as discussed in Section IV.B.
On the other hand, the mistreated employee could also leave the business and
pursue other opportunities. The employer would be stuck in a situation where it
has lost a highly qualified, highly productive employee while being forced to
move forward with a minimally qualified, less productive employee in one
position and another vacant position to fill because the former employee quit.
Thus, the employer has now been dealt a double blow.
As this situation indicates, an employer must have the ability to set
forth legitimate, non-discriminatory policies to maintain a successful business.
The employer must be able to set policies to avoid uncertainty and to provide
stability within its workplace. 6 Not only do employees have a right and
legitimate expectation that company policies will be followed to provide for
equal opportunity, so too does the employer that such policies will be followed
so that the company will operate smoothly and achieve its goals. An employer
should not be forced to make a hiring decision that could potentially increase
the likelihood of future litigation against itself. Not only could other employees
potentially bring lawsuits against the employer, but the mere fact that a
minimally qualified individual has been entrusted with the new position could
increase the likelihood of a lawsuit against the employer. In Humiston-Keeling,
Judge Posner set forth several hypotheticals that highlight this potential
conflict.
Posner's first example involved two employees of the same company
who were both disabled. 7 In Posner's hypothetical, two disabled employees
both applied for a transfer to a vacant position, but the minimally qualified
disabled individual, who requested an accommodation, was awarded the
position over the more seriously disabled, more qualified individual.2 58 The
hypothetical attempted to show the contradiction in preferential treatment to
disabled individuals when two were competing against each other instead of
awarding the position to the most qualified candidate. The employer faces a
Hobson's choice between two potential lawsuits.2 59 One disabled employee
could bring a lawsuit for failing to reasonably accommodate his disability
whereas the other disabled employee could potentially bring a lawsuit alleging
failure to hire because of his disability. EEOC Guidance states that an employer

255

See Flores, supra note 5, at 245.

256

EEOC v. Sara Lee Corp., 237 F.3d 349, 353 (4th Cir. 2001).
EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024, 1027 (7th Cir. 2000).

257

258
259

Id.
Brief for Society for Human Resources Management as Amicus Curiae Supporting

Petitioner at 10, US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2001) (No. 00-1250).
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may not disclose that an employee is receiving an accommodation because this
would usually amount to disclosing that an individual has a disability, which
may not be visible.2 60 Thus, the rejected employee will likely not know that the
and will bring suit,
employer is attempting to accommodate an individual
61
forcing the employer to suffer the costs of litigation.
Another example that Judge Posner discussed involved a 29-year-old,
262 If
white disabled employee and a 62-year-old, non-disabled black woman.
mandatory reassignment is required when both of these individuals are
interested in the same position, then the younger, white male is entitled to the
position. Posner argued that the government and the EEOC are tasked with
protecting both of these individuals because they each belong to protected
groups, but mandatory reassignment implies that one protected group is more
important than the other.263 In its amicus brief in support of US Airways in
Barnett, the Society for Human Resource Management ("SHRM") referenced
Posner's argument and briefly expanded upon it. 264 SHRM argued that the
ADA's confidentiality requirements bar the employer from divulging
information about the disabled employee's accommodation requirements. Thus,
the employer's unexplained decision to hire a minimally qualified individual
over a more qualified individual who had been with the company for years
would be seen as arbitrary and unfair.2 65 If these perceptions developed in the
workplace, they could poison the atmosphere for employees and the employer
could face charges of discrimination if non-selected individuals were part of
some other protected class. 266 Subsequently, the employer may be exposed to

allegations of discriminatory treatment for not providing a reasonable
accommodation or, on the other hand, allegations of discriminatory treatment
on the basis of another protected characteristic if it turns down the more
qualified individual. Requiring an employer to choose between being charged
with discrimination based on disability and being charged with discrimination
on the basis of another protected trait is unreasonably burdensome on the
employer. 267 Allowing the employer to maintain a legitimate, nondiscriminatory merit-based policy of hiring the most qualified candidate

260

ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE,

supra note 47,

42.

Brief for Society for Human Resources Management as Amicus Curiae Supporting
261
Petitioner, supra note 259, at 10.
Humiston-Keeling, 227 F.3d at 1027.
262
263

id.

Brief for Society for Human Resources Management as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, supra note 259, at 7.
Id. at 8-9.
265
Id. at 9.
266
Flores, supra note 5, at 246-47.
267
264
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alleviates these concerns because it allows the employer to take the protected
traits out of the equation.
An employer should not have to worry about such issues. The
employer should be able to provide his business operation with the best
opportunity to succeed that he can. A businessman should not have to suffer
long-term negative consequences by being forced to reassign a minimally
qualified individual over a more qualified individual simply because the former
has a disability, which could be completely irrelevant to his ability to perform
the job. As Judge Posner detailed in Humiston-Keeling, "there is a difference,
one of principle and not merely of cost, between requiring employers to clear
away obstacles to hiring the best applicant for a job... and requiring
employers to hire inferior (albeit minimally qualified) applicants merely
because they are members of [a protected] group. 268 Courts should resist the
temptation to improve upon Congress's work.2 69 So long as a disabled person
can perform the essential functions of the vacant job, that person should be
afforded equal consideration without regard to the disability. Congress has
made that clear.27 °
D. Refuting ScholarshipSupporting MandatedReassignment
The circuit courts and scholarship that support holding mandated
reassignment over a more qualified candidate have rooted their conclusions in
congressional statements concerning the need for the legislation. These courts
argue that the ADA's reasonable accommodation requirement must mean
something more than simply allowing the disabled employee to compete with
other candidates. 271 In essence, these scholars and courts generally argue that
the disabled employee should prevail because the consequences of him not
obtaining the vacant position are more severe than the non-disabled person not
receiving the vacant position and the burdens placed on other employees or
employers are relatively minor.2 72
Stephen Befort and Tracey Donesky argued in favor of mandated
reassignment in their article Reassignment Under the Americans with
DisabilitiesAct: Reasonable Accommodation, Affirmative Action, or Both? 273
They asserted that the ADA's central purpose was to help disabled individuals
participate fully in the American workplace and given the choice between
terminating or retaining an already existing employee, the employer should

269

EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024, 1028-29 (7th Cir. 2000).
Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1181 (10th Cir. 1999) (Kelly, J., dissenting).

270

Id.

268

271
See Midland Brake, 180 F.3d 1154; Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Center, 156 F.3d 1284 (D.C.
Cir.
1998); EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc., 693 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2012).

272

See Porter, supra note 234; Befort & Donesky, supra note 23; Befort, supra note 247.

273

Befort & Donesky, supra note 23, at 1087-88.
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choose to retain the existing employee.274 Befort and Donesky also argued that
retaining the disabled employee provided a benefit to the employer because he
was retaining someone who was already familiar with the intricacies and
policies of the employer's business.275 They asserted that the disabled
employee has weightier interests in the position than an outside applicant
276
because of his previous employment and time spent with the employer.
On the other hand, what about the interests of the disabled employee
compared to another existing employee who also seeks transfer to the vacant
position? Befort and Donesky address this concern, as well as Nicole
Buonocore Porter in her article, Martinizing Title I of the Americans with
DisabilitiesAct. 277 Befort and Donesky conceded that many of the interests that
were at issue when compared to a non-employed applicant disappeared when
the disabled employee was competing with a coworker.2 78 However, they,
along with Porter, concluded that the disabled employee should still be granted
preferential treatment because if he did not get the accommodation, he would
be out of a job. 279 The other employee, on the other hand, could still remain in
his current position, with chances for transfer or promotion later in the
future.28 ° Porter concluded that giving the disabled employee the reassignment
put him on equal footing with other non-disabled employees, not just the ability
to compete for the position. 281 Befort and Donesky concluded that the employer
benefitted by avoiding violation of the ADA and by retaining the non-disabled,
highly qualified individual for future transfer or promotion.282
A basic assumption that these scholars and courts make is that the nondisabled candidates, other coworkers, and the employers are only minimally
affected by mandated reassignment. However, as the previous sections argue,
this assumption is not always accurate. For instance, where a coworker also
seeks transfer to the vacant position, he seeks that position for some reason.
Perhaps he views it as a better position for his circumstances. But perhaps it is
the case that the non-disabled employee cannot continue working in his current
position for some reason that is not protected by a statute. Suppose the nondisabled employee is in a situation where he will have to quit if he does not
obtain the vacant position. Outside of good faith or loyalty, the employer does
not have an obligation to accommodate his need for the vacant position, thus he

275

Id.
Id.

276

Id. at 1088.

277

279

Id. at 1088-89; Porter, supra note 234, at 576.
Befort & Donesky, supra note 23, at 1088.
Id.; Porter, supranote 234, at 576.

280

Porter, supra note 234, at 576.

281

Id.

282

Befort & Donesky, supra note 23, at 1089.

274

278
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would also be out of a job if he does not get the vacant position. Befort,
Donesky, and Porter would argue that he would have a better opportunity to
find another position than the disabled employee. In theory, this may be true,
but in practical terms it may not be. The non-disabled employee could face an
equally long road back to gainful employment as the disabled individual.
Moreover, other burdens the employees have to undertake are not minor, as
highlighted in earlier sections. Anti-discrimination statutes such as the ADA
and Title VII were meant to promote equality among all people, regardless of
their unalterable characteristics, not put the liberty rights of one person above
another.
V.

THE FOURTH CIRCUIT SHOULD FOLLOW THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

The Fourth Circuit has yet to weigh in on whether a lesser qualified
disabled employee should automatically be reassigned to a vacant position over
a more qualified candidate. Though the court made some mention of employer
obligations under the ADA in Sara Lee, that case was decided in the context of
a seniority system. In Jackson,283 the court determined that the plaintiff was not
disabled within the meaning of the ADA, and thus did not reach the question of
whether he should be reassigned over a more qualified candidate.2 84 Thus, in
this instance, the Fourth Circuit missed the opportunity to settle this issue
within its jurisdiction.
Timothy Jackson's case was a superb opportunity for the Fourth Circuit
panel to decide this issue. Jackson had requested to be transferred to several
positions, but was not chosen because the company hired more qualified
candidates. 285 The case presented the court an opportune time to affirm what it
alluded to in Sara Lee-that an employer is not obligated to abandon a nondiscriminatory policy.286 Sara Lee stated that an employer must be able to treat
a disabled employee as it would any other worker when the company operated
a legitimate, non-discriminatory policy.2 87 Moreover, the district court
referenced the language of Sara Lee stating that the ADA does not require
employers to penalize employees free from disability to vindicate the rights of
disabled workers2 88 Thus, the opportunity was present for the court to address
the issue directly.
283

Jackson v. Fujifilm Mfg. USA, Inc., 447 F. App'x. 515 (4th Cir. 2011).

284

id.

Jackson v. Fujifilm Mfg. USA, Inc., No. 8:09-1328-RBH-BHH, 2010 WL 5778218,
(D.S.C. June 18, 2010).
286
EEOC v. Sara Lee, Corp., 237 F.3d 349, 355 (4th Cir. 2001); Supreme Court Declines
to
Decide ADA Reassignment Question, 24 THOMPSON'S ADA COMPLIANCE GUIDE 1, July, 2013, at
12.
287 Sara Lee, 237 F.3d at 355.
2188 Jackson, 2010 WL 5778218, at *7.
285
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The court should have found that an employer is not obligated to
transfer a disabled employee over a more qualified non-disabled candidate.
This would put the Fourth Circuit in line with the Eighth Circuit's decision in
Huber and the Fifth Circuit's decision in Daugherty. Though Huber was
influenced by the Seventh Circuit's now overturned decision in HumistonKeeling, the case and the reasoning employed still remain valid. Furthermore,
there is support for the proposition that mandatory reassignment is not required
in the Second, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits as well. 289 Likewise, there is also
support for non-preferential treatment from the Supreme Court itself in Barnett.
Justice Breyer specifically referred to the burden imposed upon fellow
29 ° While
employees if the seniority policy in question were to be violated.
seniority systems are outside the scope of this Note, the burdens imposed on
third party employees by violation of a non-discriminatory hiring or transfer
policy are very similar. Moreover, Justice Breyer stated that the ADA requires
the same
preferences that are needed "for those with disabilities to 29obtain
enjoy. 1
workplace" opportunities that non-disabled individuals
Thus, although the Fourth Circuit missed an opportunity in Jackson,
the court should find that the ADA does not mandate an employer to reassign a
disabled employee to a vacant position over a more qualified candidate when it
is presented with this question in the future. This is a question that is ripe for
settling. At the moment, businesses and employees alike are stuck in the limbo
of uncertainty. Employees, both disabled and non-disabled, are uncertain about
their rights under the current state of the law. Employers are left uncertain how
to handle situations where other accommodations simply have not worked, yet
the disabled employee only has the minimal qualifications to succeed.
Reassignment of a disabled employee to a vacant position is not a simple
accommodation like installing a ramp for an individual confined to a
wheelchair or altering a work schedule. It is a major shift in workplace
dynamics that alters the status quo in a way that no other accommodation
can. 292 As Justice Scalia observed in Barnett, other accommodations listed in
the ADA require the employer to modify policies or procedures that burden a

Supreme Court Declines to Decide ADA Reassignment Question, supra note 286; see
Hedrick v. W. Reserve Care Sys. and Forum Health, 355 F.3d 444 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that
while an employer may have an obligation to reassign an employee to a vacant position for which
she is qualified, the ADA does not mandate that she be afforded preferential treatment); Terrell v.
USAIR, 132 F.3d 621, 627 (11 th Cir. 1998) ("We cannot accept that Congress, in enacting the
ADA, intended to grant preferential treatment for disabled workers."); Wemick v. Fed. Reserve
Bank of N.Y., 91 F.3d 379 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that an employer did not have an affirmative
duty to provide the employee with a job for which she was qualified; it only had an obligation to
treat her in the same manner that it treated other similarly qualified candidates).
290 US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 400 (2002).
289

291 Id. at 397 (emphasis in original).
292 Long, supra note 211, at 871.
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disabled employee "because of [his or her] disability., 293 Contrary to this,
reassignment may require the employer to modify an existing policy that is in
no way related to the individual's disability. 294 Forcing an employer to alter
policies or procedures that are not related to the disabled employee's
impediment goes beyond the scope of the ADA and inherently creates an undue
hardship on the employer.
VI. CONCLUSION

Reassignment as a reasonable accommodation is one of the most
controversial and tricky accommodations under the ADA today. The circuits
have been divided on the issue for some time and the Seventh Circuit's recent
flip has only fanned the fire. This Note has attempted to outline the issue,
discussing the various court decisions that have dealt with the issue. This Note
argued that mandatory reassignment of a disabled employee over a more
qualified candidate, whether disabled or not, should be considered
unreasonable in most circumstances. Merit-based hiring is the most effective
employment practice for both the employer and the employees. It is not
efficient to force an employer to retain a minimally qualified employee when
there is a more qualified candidate for a vacant position. Ignoring stereotypes,
eliminating physical barriers to the handicapped, and revising tests with an
adverse impact on the disabled are all valid concerns that the ADA seeks to
prohibit.2 95 They require some costs to be borne by all of society or by
particular employers for the benefit of the disabled, but they do not require
unlimited generosity. 96 Thus, when it is presented with this issue in the future,
the Fourth Circuit should stay in line with its precedent to find that the ADA
does not require mandatory reassignment and employers should be permitted to
make hiring or transfer decisions based on merit.
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